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Since the 1990s, the Spanish economy has been characterized by a continuous
growth in immigrant flows from African, Latin American, and European countries.
By January 2007, a total of 4.48 millions of foreigners––the equivalent of 9.93% of
the population––resided in Spain (Padro´n Municipal, INE 2007). Most immigrants
live in Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia, Valencia, Murcia and the Canary or Balearic
Islands. The continuous growth in immigrant flows of the late nineties coexisted
with a decrease in net inter-regional flows despite significant unemployment rate
differences across regions. We know through previous work by Bentolila and
Blanchard (1990), Bentolila and Dolado (1991), Bentolila (2002) and Bover and
Velilla (1999) that high unemployment rates are the main reason behind the
observed decline in internal migration on the part of natives. However, why have
immigrant flows increased? Are immigrants responding to labor market opportu-
nities more than natives and, if so, have immigrant inflows significantly impacted
regional labor market disparities?
In this paper, we use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de
Poblacio´n Activa) from 1999 through 2007 to first examine immigrants’ respon-
siveness to employment opportunities relative to natives and, as such, better
understand these new migratory patterns. Given immigrants’ heterogeneity by
country of origin, we distinguish among three major groups of Spanish immigrants
in our analysis: Africans, Europeans, and Latinos. Subsequently, we analyze
whether these immigrant flows have altered regional unemployment disparities.
Our work adds to previous work in the literature examining the location choices
of immigrants (see, for instance, Bartel 1989; Borjas 2001) and the local labor
market implications of immigrant residential choices (e.g. Borjas, Freeman and
Katz 1996; Borjas 2001; Card 2001; more recently Borjas 2003). As noted by this
second strand of literature, ‘‘area-approach’’ analyses relating regional immigration
flows to regional employment opportunities via regression-based analyses are
inappropriate because: (1) they fail to account for forces, other than immigrant
flows, affecting immigrants’ location decisions, and (2) they do not take into
account the fact that natives may also be ‘‘voting with their feet’’. Therefore, using
skill groups defined for each year and region as our units of observation, we
construct indexes capturing the relative supply of immigrants as compared to
natives. We then use these indexes as dependent variables when examining
immigrant location choices and their potential impacts on regional employment
disparities.
Much of the earlier literature examining immigrant location choices has
primarily focused on the role played by existing networks of countrymen (e.g.
Bartel 1989; Chiswick and Miller 1996). If immigrants from a particular country
have similar skills and occupational preferences, they will tend to locate in regions
offering better employment choices and higher earnings. The clustering of these
immigrants will, in turn, give birth to ethnic enclaves that further raise the marginal
benefit of moving to that region via higher wages (e.g. Mouw 2003; Munshi 2003;
Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2007), while lowering the associated marginal costs
via shorter job searches and lower psychic costs (e.g. Granovetter 1973, 1974;
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Bartel 1989; Fernandez et al. 2000; Munshi 2003). However, due to the recent
nature of immigration in Spain and the relatively young age of immigrants in our
sample,1 we focus on the role of labor market conditions as a pull factor as networks
are likely to develop thereafter.
In addition to networks, the literature examining immigrant location choices has
also focused on the role played by wages (e.g. Borjas 2001). Due to the lack of
adequate wage data and in light of the traditionally high unemployment rates
characteristic of some Spanish regions, we instead examine immigrant responsive-
ness to labor market prospects relative to natives. Employment opportunities may be
particularly relevant in the case of immigrants, for whom accessibility to any type of
employment may be crucial for their immediate economic survival upon arrival to
the host country. We capture work prospects with regional employment rates for
each skill group. We hypothesize that immigrants are more responsive than natives
to regional employment opportunities given their lower migration costs across
Spanish regions relative to natives. After all, natives have to break up family ties
and withdraw from the safety net provided by these strong ties––a psychic costs
already incurred by immigrants when deciding to emigrate.
Why should we care about immigrants’ responsiveness to regional labor market
conditions relative to their native counterparts? In Spain, relatively sticky wages and
high costs of adjustment due to union contract provisions, social norms, and
government legislation regarding job protection policies have reduced the rate at
which new jobs are created and increased the duration of unemployment, leading to
higher structural unemployment rates (Bentolila and Blanchard 1990; Bentolila and
Dolado 1991; Bentolila 2002). As such, immigrants’ greater responsiveness to better
employment prospects could play a crucial role in correcting regional employment
imbalances (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1992).
Our results indicate that immigrants choose to reside in regions with larger
employment rates and where their likelihood of finding a job is higher. This is
particularly true for African and Latino immigrants, who have lesser educational
attainment and exhibit higher unemployment rates. Non-15 European immigrants,
perhaps owing to their greater skill transferability, do not seem to significantly differ
from natives in their response to the employment outlook when choosing where to
reside. In any event, the recent immigration shock seems to have only temporarily
helped lower regional employment rate disparities.
In what follows, we first describe some of the features of the Spanish labor
market, such as its traditionally high unemployment rate and the recent receipt of
large immigrant flows. Subsequently, we present our hypotheses and discuss the
methodology we rely upon to examine immigrants’ responsiveness to regional
employment opportunities and its effect on regional employment disparities. Results
and conclusions close the study.
1 As noted by Bartel (1989), young individuals are likely to face lower psychic costs to relocation. This is
particularly true among immigrants, who are then less likely to need the emotional support offered by
ethnic enclaves.
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2 Institutional framework
2.1 Spanish immigration and migration policy
Up to the mid 1970s, Spain had experienced more out-migration than immigration.
As shown by Fig. 1, immigration grew at a particular fast pace from the late 1990s
onwards despite the restrictions that the ‘Aliens’ Law’ of 1985 imposed on non-
European Union foreigners in order to establish Spanish residency and citizenship.2
Over the 12-year period shown in Fig. 1, the number of foreign-born living in
Spain grew from less than 1% of the population to approximately 10%. Various
elements steered this trend, such as the country’s democratization, the rapid
economic growth in part fueled by Spain’s incorporation to the European Common
Market in 1986, the free-entrance of foreigners as tourists together with a lax
implementation of immigration laws, and the close linguistic, cultural ties, and
preferential treatment to Latin Americans due to colonial history (Escriva´ 2000;
Ribas-Mateos 2000).
As of today, in spite of augmented immigration restrictions consisting of limited
work and residency permit renewals, as well as immigration quotas implemented
during the 1990s,3 Spain is considered the most popular port of entry for Latino
immigrants (Millman and Vitzthum 2003). Additionally, Spain receives a signif-
icant immigrant flow from Africa, particularly Morocco, given its proximity to the
Spanish peninsula. Immigrant flows from these two regions have been primarily
propelled by the investment of Spanish companies in Latin America, as well as by
the political and economic crises in Latin America and Africa during much of the
1990s. Based on our sample of immigrants from the Spanish Labour Force Survey
(1999–2007) and according to the figures in Table 1, the vast majority of
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Fig. 1 Evolution of foreigners as a percentage of the Spanish population (1996–2007). Source: Spanish
Institute of Statistics––Padro´n Municipal
2 One of these restrictions include the need to acquire a work and a residency permit in order to become
legal immigrants, along with the granting of 1-year permits to work in a particular activity and geographic
location.
3 Starting in 1993, the Spanish government has been implementing a quota system for agriculture and
domestic services. See Escriva´ (2000) for greater details.
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groups are immigrants from Africa (24.4%) and non-15 European countries
(24.3%).4 In some regions, as is the case with Catalonia and Murcia, African
immigrants constitute the second largest immigrant group after Latinos. Addition-
ally, the figures in Table 2 suggest that most immigrants choose to reside in either
Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia or Andalucı´a.
What is the role played by regional labor market conditions in attracting these
immigrant flows? In particular, do job opportunities serve as immigrant magnets to
these regions? And, does the location choice of immigrants in turn help correct
regional imbalances? Before addressing the aforementioned questions, it is
important to highlight some key features of the Spanish labor market.
2.2 The Spanish unemployment rate
One of the crucial characteristics of the Spanish labor market has been its
traditionally high unemployment rate, particularly during the eighties and early
nineties. Still today, despite the impressive economic growth enjoyed by the
Spanish economy, Spain continues to have one of the highest unemployment rates
Table 1 A composition of regional immigrant stocks by place of origin (%)
Distribution of immigrants Africa Europe no. 15 Latin America Number of immigrants
Andalucia 22.1 26.8 51.1 1,837
Arago´n 27.2 34.1 38.7 1,178
Asturias 10.5 20.4 69.1 181
Balears 25.3 13.8 61.0 1,266
Canary Islands 17.4 9.2 73.4 1,351
Cantabria 3.0 24.3 72.7 301
Castilla-Leo´n 17.2 35.2 47.6 1,392
Castilla-La Mancha 21.9 38.1 40.0 1,466
Catalonia 42.6 14.3 43.1 3,868
Com. Valenciana 20.5 35.7 43.9 3,319
Extremadura 47.0 15.7 37.3 236
Galicia 13.0 11.3 75.7 462
Madrid 13.0 24.1 63.0 2,717
Murcia 33.2 8.1 58.7 1,659
Navarra 11.1 21.0 67.9 539
Paı´s Vasco 19.2 20.5 60.3 532
Rioja, La 25.9 24.5 49.6 575
Source: Spanish Labor Force survey, 1999–2007. Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Immigrants from
Asia, North-America and Other are excluded from the sample as they represent less than 5% of total
immigrants. Individuals from EU-15 are not considered as immigrants either
4 Immigrants from Asia, North America and Oceania represent, altogether, less than 5% of all
immigrants. Therefore, we exclude them from the analysis. EU-15 citizens have not been considered
under the category of immigrants given their differences with respect to the vast majority of immigrants
in our sample.
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among other OECD countries. Table 3 displays average unemployment rates
nationwide as well as by region for selected years: 1976, 1991, 2003, and 2005.
Average unemployment rates remained well above 10% since the mid eighties for
practically a decade. Moreover, there are very important unemployment rate
differences across regions. In particular, while unemployment rates in Navarra,
Baleares, Arago´n, La Rioja or Madrid are below 7%, Extremadura, Andalucı´a,
Canary Islands, Galicia and Asturias exhibit double-digit unemployment rates.
As noted by Bentolila (2002), Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), and Bentolila and
Dolado (1991), among others, sticky wages accompanied by limited internal
geographic mobility may have perpetuated regional imbalances between labor
demand and supply and, therefore, structural unemployment. Consequently, a better
understanding of the geographic mobility of immigrants is of great importance as
their responsiveness to differences in employment rates across regions could help
correct regional labor market imbalances (Blanchard and Katz 1992). Do
immigrants locate in regions with better employment prospects? A joint look to
the figures in Tables 1 and 3 reveals that some of the regions with the highest
incidence of immigration, such as Madrid or Catalonia, have relatively low
unemployment rates (approximately 7%) in 2005. Yet, other immigrant receiving
regions, such as Andalucı´a or Valencia, display unemployment rates in the order of
14 and 9%, correspondingly. Therefore, at a descriptive level, it is unclear whether
immigrants choose to reside in regions offering better employment prospects.
Table 2 Immigrant regional distribution by place of origin
Immigrant regional distribution Africa Europe no. 15 Latin America
Andalucia 7.3 9.2 7.9
Arago´n 5.7 7.6 3.8
Asturias 0.3 0.7 1.0
Balears 5.7 3.3 6.4
Canary Islands 4.3 2.3 8.4
Cantabria 0.2 1.4 1.8
Castilla-Leo´n 4.4 9.2 5.6
Castilla-La Mancha 5.7 10.4 4.8
Catalonia 30.0 10.4 13.9
Com. Valenciana 12.3 22.3 12.2
Extremadura 2.0 0.7 0.8
Galicia 1.2 1.0 2.9
Madrid 6.3 12.3 14.3
Murcia 9.9 2.6 8.1
Navarra 1.2 2.1 3.1
Paı´s Vasco 1.8 2.0 2.7
Rioja, La 2.7 2.5 2.4
Total 5,579 5,320 11,960
Source: Spanish Labor Force survey, 1999–2007. Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Immigrants from
Asia, North-America and Other are excluded from the sample as they represent less than 5% of total
immigrants. Individuals from EU-15 are not considered as immigrants either
392 SERIEs (2010) 1:387–407
123
3 Conceptual framework
The migration decision can be viewed as an investment decision where both natives
and foreign-born individuals are income maximizers. As such, migration decisions
are guided by the comparison of the present value of lifetime earnings in alternative
employment opportunities net of migration costs. If migration costs primarily
consist of large fixed costs, many individuals may not find it worth while to migrate.
Specifically, if the potential earnings differential across regions is not large enough,
many natives will choose to stay home as inter-regional wage differences will not
compensate for incurred migration costs. In contrast, if most immigrants originate
from countries with significantly lower wages (as it may be the case with migrants
originating from many African and Latin American nations), the earnings
differential between Spain and their home countries is likely to widely exceed
any earnings differentials encountered by natives between Spanish regions. In this
case, we may observe more international than internal native migration.
Furthermore, once in Spain, foreign-born individuals are likely to exhibit lower
migration costs than natives with strong ties to their birth communities. After all,
natives have to break up family ties when migrating from one region to another,
whereas immigrants have already incurred this psychological cost by choosing to start
anew in the host country. At the most, they may have to give up networks of countrymen
they may have connected with. Therefore, immigrants should be more likely to choose
to reside in the region r where their labor earnings are expected to be larger.
Table 3 Regional unemployment rates for selected years
Regions Years
1976 1991 2003 2005
Andalucia 9.35 24.47 18.17 13.78
Arago´n 2.54 9.37 6.48 6.28
Asturias 3.08 15.69 10.74 10.82
Balears 3.32 8.5 9.18 6.03
Canary Islands 8.55 24.49 11.56 12.38
Cantabria 2.78 15.25 10.48 9.09
Castilla and Leo´n 2.69 14.5 11.19 8.64
Castilla-La Mancha 4.57 13.71 9.74 9.35
Catalonia 3.46 11.68 9.37 7.12
Valencia 3.23 15.78 10.94 9.24
Extremadura 4.27 24.32 16.51 15.15
Galicia 1.56 12.56 11.85 11.11
Madrid 4.66 11.26 7.01 6.87
Murcia 4.77 16.59 9.56 8.05
Navarra 3.94 10.24 5.15 5.12
Paı´s Vasco 3.45 18.7 9 7.57
Rioja 1.63 9.26 5.58 6.45
Country average 4.41 15.88 11.2 9.33
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Unfortunately, we know of no data set containing representative individual level
information on earnings and immigrant status. Yet, due to traditionally high
unemployment rates, workers may be particularly responsive to employment
prospects. As such, we focus on the role played by the probability of finding





where: j ¼ 1; . . .; 17 for each of the 17 Spanish regions.
Specifically, wrs stands for the wage earned by a person with skills s in region r
and /rs represents her/his employment likelihood.
In sum, the described framework has some interesting implications for
understanding the high immigration rate and, yet, the low internal mobility of
natives in Spain. First, immigrants should exhibit a greater responsiveness to
employment opportunities than natives. Secondly, by being more responsive than
their native counterparts, immigrants may promote employment convergence across
regions. Why? As noted by the previous literature (Bentolila and Blanchard 1990;
Bentolila and Dolado 1991; Bentolila and Jimeno 1998), the traditionally high
Spanish unemployment can be characterized as structural unemployment arising
from regional imbalances in labor demand and supply. This type of unemployment
typically persists in the presence of sticky wages––typically resulting from union
contract provisions, social norms or government legislation concerning (such as
minimum wages and job protection policies)––and if internal mobility is low, as
argued by Bentolila and Dolado (1991), Bentolila (2002) and Bover and Velilla
(1999). Under such circumstances, the higher responsiveness of immigrants to
employment opportunities in specific regions could help erode regional imbalances
in unemployment (e.g. Blanchard and Katz 1992).
4 Methodology
4.1 Are immigrants more responsive than natives to employment opportunities?
Traditionally, a variety of studies have relied on regional correlations between
immigration rates and labor market conditions to learn about the role of the latter in
attracting immigrant flows. However, this ‘‘area approach’’ strategy has come under
criticism, notably by Borjas et al. (1996), Borjas (2001), Card (2001) and more
recently Borjas (2003) on two counts. First, labor market conditions in a particular
region could be affected by native inflows and outflows regardless of immigrant
flows. If so, how can we measure the impact of labor market conditions on the
supply of immigrants relative to natives when labor market conditions themselves
are a by-product of native migration flows? Second, cross-sectional analyses may
fail to account for demand shocks affecting local labor market conditions and, as
such, incite an erroneous interpretation of the correlation coefficients between
immigrant flows and labor market conditions.
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To lessen any omitted variable biases, we follow the methodology proposed by
Borjas (2001) and used by Carrasco et al. (2008), among others, which consists in
simply grouping the individual data in cells defined for different skill groups,
regions, and years. This unit of observation recognizes that immigrants are a very
heterogeneous group. As such, we assume that natives only compete with
immigrants with similar skills. Each skill group is an age-education cell where
both age and education are defined over three categories (age: 30 or less, 31–45, and
45 plus; education: primary education or less, secondary education, and university
degree). Therefore, we have nine skill groups.5 We then measure the supply of
immigrants (relative to natives) in a particular region at a point in time for each of
the nine age-education groups with the following index:
KrsðtÞ ¼ IrsðtÞ=IsðtÞ
NrsðtÞ=NsðtÞ ð2Þ
where Irs(t) represents the number of immigrants in region r and skill (age-
education) group s at period t, and Nrs(t) represents the number of natives in region r
and skill group s at period t. Therefore, the index Krs(t) measures the relative supply
of immigrants vis a` vis natives in a particular skill group, region, and time period.
The index equals 1 when immigrant and native workers of the same skill level have
the same geographic distribution, and it is greater than 1 when immigrants in a
particular skill group are overrepresented in a particular region at a specific point in
time. Since we are working with 9 skill groups, 17 regions (or Autonomous
Communities), and 9 years (1999–2007), the index in Eq. 2 is defined for 1,377
groups (i.e. 9 skill groups 9 17 regions 9 9 years).
To the extent that regional employment opportunities and the relative supply of
immigrants are likely to be simultaneously determined, instrumenting the former
may be necessary. However, as recognized by others (e.g. Borjas 2001), finding a
set of valid instruments, i.e. a set of variables that are highly correlated with regional
employment opportunities, yet uncorrelated with any of the variables explaining the
relative supply of immigrants to natives, is virtually impossible. As such, we instead
lag our explanatory variable to at least guarantee its pre-determined character. This
model specification is likely to also best reflect how migrants behave. Since
migration involves an important human capital investment decision, it is reasonable
to observe a time lag between the time period to which the regional employment
conditions are referred to and immigrant flows. Therefore, we estimate the
following model:
Krs ¼ b½Ersðt  1Þ þ ms þ gr þ ht þ ðms  htÞ þ ðgr  htÞ þ ðms  grÞ þ ersðtÞ ð3Þ
where Ersðt  1Þ stands for past employment opportunities for individuals of skill s
in region r at time (t - 1). Additionally, Eq. 3 includes a series of fixed-effects
vectors, such as: ms stand for skill (age-education) fixed-effects, gr for regional fixed-
effects, and ht for time fixed-effects, and their interaction terms. In this manner, we
5 These nine skill groups are defined as follows: (1) primary or less and 30 years or less, (2) primary or
less and 31–45 years, (3) primary or less and 45 plus years, (4) secondary and 30 years or less, (5)
secondary and 31–45 years, (6) secondary and 45 years or more, (7) university and 30 years or less, (8)
university and 31–45 years, (9) university and 45 years or more.
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are able to capture educational, regional and time characteristics possibly affecting
the relative supply of immigrants to natives in a particular cell, such as differences
in the educational system, regional cost-of-living differences or housing shortages,
and macroeconomic trends. Equation 3 is estimated for all immigrants (relative to
natives) as well as separately for our most prominent groups of immigrants: Latinos,
Europeans (non-EU15), and Africans.
4.2 Does immigration help reduce regional employment disparities?
A second question of great interest to us is whether the increase in immigration has
brought about regional convergence in employment rates by attracting migrants to
regions with higher employment rates versus regions with lower employment rates.
As discussed earlier in the paper, much of the Spanish unemployment can be
classified as structural unemployment arising from regional imbalances in labor
demand and supply. This type of unemployment could be significantly reduced via
immigrants’ greater responsiveness to employment opportunities in specific regions.
To assess whether immigration inflows can help reduce regional differences in
employment rates for a given skill group, we first define our dependent variable as
follows:
ErsðtÞ  EsðtÞ ð4Þ
where Ers(t) is the employment rate for skill group s in region r and year t and EsðtÞ
is the average employment rate for skill group s across all Spanish regions in year t.
Once we have our dependent variable capturing differences in regional employment
rates for each skill group and year from the national average, we use the immigrant
penetration index defined in Borjas (2001) to examine whether immigration affects
regional convergence in employment rates. The immigrant penetration index is
defined as:




where Irsðt; t þ 1Þ is the number of immigrants in skill group s entering a particular
region r between t and t ? 1 and Nrs(t) is the number of natives in skill group s in
region r at time period t. We then use our dependent variable from Eq. 3, which we
refer to as y, and the immigrant penetration index (i.e. x in what follows) to estimate
a panel vector autoregressive (panel VAR) model and gauge whether and, if so, to
what extent, immigration helps attain regional employment convergence.
Panel VARs are useful in identifying a causal relationship between immigration
and employment while addressing: (a) the endogeneity of our series, (b) the
unobserved skill group and regional specific heterogeneity, and (c) the low
frequency at which they are reported (i.e. annually). Indeed, the use of a panel VAR
addresses the endogeneity problem as the methodology treats all the variables in the
system as endogenous. Moreover, the panel VAR also helps us address the
unobserved skill group and regional specific heterogeneity while, at the same time,
overcoming the data limitation problem by stacking the data for the various skill
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groups in each region. As such, the use of panel VARs seems appropriate for our
analysis. In fact, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) argue that panel data are perfectly fitted
for VARs as few years of data are required to estimate such models. This is possible
because the sampling properties depend on the number of cross-sections (i) and not
on the number of years (t). Some authors even argue that the asymptotic results are
easier to derive for panel data than for time series data (see Gilchrist and Himmelber
1998). In what follows, we provide a short description of the methodology used in
this analysis.6
The ‘th equation of a 1 lag panel VAR can be written as:
y‘it ¼ a‘i þ c‘t þ x0itb‘ þ e‘it; ð6Þ
where a‘i is the cross-section [i.e. the (skill, region) groups] specific effect, c
‘
t is the
year specific effect, xit is an ‘x1 vector of lagged endogenous variables (i.e. the
immigration penetration index), b‘ is an ‘x1 vector of slope coefficients, and e‘it is
the idiosyncratic error. In order to eliminate year and cross-section fixed effects, we
make two transformations. First, we express all variables in the model as deviations
from year specific means to remove year specific effects (i.e. the data are time
demeaned). Second, we transform all variables in the model to deviations from
forward means (Helmert’s transformation) to remove cross-section fixed effects.
Since the cross-section fixed effects are correlated with the regressors (xit) by virtue
of the lagged dependent variable, the mean differencing procedure commonly used
to eliminate these cross-section fixed effects will create biased coefficients (Love
and Zicchino 2006). To avoid this problem, we use forward mean differencing (see
Arellano and Bover 1995). Let y‘it, xit and e
‘
it denote the means constructed from the
future values of y‘it; xit and e
‘
it: Then, our transformations are given by:
~y‘it ¼ dit y‘it  y‘it
 
; ð7Þ
~xit ¼ dit xit  xitð Þ; ð8Þ




ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðTi  tÞ=ðTi  t þ 1Þp and Ti denotes the last year of data available for
a given (skill, region) cross-section. We are not able to calculate this transformation
for the last year of data, since there are no future values for the construction of the
forward means. Accordingly, we lose this observation. The final transformed model
is thus given by:
~y‘it ¼ ~x0itb‘ þ ~e‘it ð10Þ
Thus, we used an orthogonal deviation, in which we express each observation as
a deviation of average future observations. We weight each observation to
standardize the variance. If the original errors are not autocorrelated and have a
constant variance, the transformed errors should exhibit similar properties. Thus,
this transformation preserves homocedasticity and does not induce serial correlation
(Arellano and Bover 1995). Additionally, we use lagged regressors as instruments in
our GMM estimation. To the extent that the instruments are lagged values of xit,
6 The empirical analysis is conducted using the package in Love (2001).
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they remain uncorrelated with the transformed error term, that is: E xits~e‘it
  ¼ 0 for
all s C 0 (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988; Gilchrist and Himmelber 1998).
Our panel VAR model thus has 153 (i.e. 9 skill groups 9 17 regions) groups as
cross-sections observed over eight years. We estimate both the variance decom-
positions (VDCs) and impulse response functions (IRFs). VDCs inform us on the
portion of the forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to its own
innovations and to innovations from the other variables in the system. The IRFs
further inform on the sign and time trajectory of the impact of a one standard
deviation shock to one of the variables in the system on the outcome of interest. To
compute VDCs and IRFs, we need to impose some structure on the system. We
choose to do so by orthogonalizing the residuals using Choleski’s decomposition.
The Choleski decomposition imposes a minimal set of assumptions to identify our
system. In particular, it implies a recursive ordering of the variables in the VAR
according to which variables listed earlier in the ordering are considered to be more
exogenous. Therefore, the Choleski decomposition attributes all of the effect of any
common component to the variable that comes first in the VAR system. To the
extent that we are interested in learning about the impact of an immigration shock
on regional employment disparities, it seems reasonable to then list the immigration
penetration index at the beginning of the ordering. Finally, what is the meaning of
this structure? As noted by Enders (1995), this decomposition implies, in our case,
that immigration shocks affect regional employment disparities with a lag.
Therefore, the proposed model allows us to assess how immigration impacts
regional employment convergence or, alternatively, how regional employment
convergence adjusts over time to a shock to the immigration penetration index
series.
5 Data and descriptive evidence
5.1 Data
We use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey for the period 1999 through
2007. This survey is administered to approximately 60,000 households on a
quarterly basis. For the empirical analysis, we use a pooled cross-sectional database
of all active immigrants included in the survey. We define immigrants as individuals
with a foreign citizenship and exclude those from EU-15 countries as they are not
representative of most immigrants in Spain. This definition thus includes individuals
with a double nationality –a group that accounts for 3% of our sample. At any rate,
we exclude naturalized citizens from our definition of immigrants since questions
like the years of residence in the country are only asked to non-naturalized
immigrants. As such, the small sample size of individuals with a double nationality
from birth ends up not altering our findings. The survey collects detailed personal
and job characteristics from every interviewed individual, native or immigrant, with
the exception of wages. In addition, for immigrants, we have information on their
country of origin and on the number of years residing in Spain.
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It is worth noting that immigrants in the Labor Force Survey reside in registered
households; otherwise, they would have never been interviewed by the survey.
Therefore, immigrants in our sample are most likely authorized immigrants,
restricting the validity of our inferences to this group. At any rate, to ensure the most
representativeness of our data as far as immigrant concentration and distribution is
concerned, we use the last release of the EPA, where observations are weighted
according to the 2001 Population Census believed to better account for the
immigrant population.7 Finally, given our focus on immigrant responsiveness to
employment opportunities relative to natives, we restrict our sample to individuals
in working age, i.e., 16–64 years of age.
5.2 Immigrant and native profiles according to skill
The largest fraction of our immigrant sample, about 52.3% of all immigrants
between 16 and 64 years of age comes from Central and South America. An
additional 24.4% originates in Africa and 24.3% comes from Non-15 European
countries.
What are some of the characteristics of natives and immigrants in our sample?
Table 4 addresses this question. For instance, immigrants are approximately 6 years
younger than natives and a slightly higher fraction are female relative to natives.
Education-wise, natives display a higher educational attainment than the average
immigrant in our sample although, as we shall discuss in what follows, there are
important differences by immigrant origin.
Table 4 Mean and standard deviations of key characteristics of natives and immigrants in the sample
(%)
Variables Natives Immigrants Africans Non-15 Europeans Latinos
Female 50.5 (0.49) 51.7 (0.49) 38.3 (0.48) 52.3 (0.49) 57.7 (0.49)
Age 38.7 (13.68) 32.6 (10.20) 32.19 (9.76) 32.5 (10.28) 32.8 (10.35)
Head of household 27.4 (0.44) 20.5 (0.40) 24.2 (0.43) 19.6 (0.40) 19.23 (0.39)
Married 57.0 (0.49) 54.13 (0.49) 59.5 (0.49) 59.13 (0.49) 49.4 (0.49)
Education
Primary or less 27.7 (0.44) 25.4 (0.44) 45.13 (0.49) 14.92 (0.35) 21.01 (0.41)
Secondary 49.9 (0.50) 53.7 (0.49) 36.4 (0.48) 57.63 (0.49) 60.11 (0.49)
University 22.35 (0.41) 20.76 (0.40) 18.46 (0.39) 27.44 (0.44) 18.9 (0.39)
Work Status
Employed 54.4 (0.49) 65.4 (0.47) 54.9 (0.49) 69.9 (0.46) 68.21 (0.47)
Unemployed 8.06 (0.27) 11.2 (0.31) 14.4 (0.35) 9.62 (0.29) 10.3 (0.30)
Observations 981,693 225,859 5,579 5,320 11,960
Individuals between 16 and 64 years. Immigrants from Asia, North-America and Other are excluded from
the sample as they represent less than 5% of total immigrants. Individuals from EU-15 are not considered
in the sample of immigrants either. Standard deviations in brackets. All statistics are weighted
7 For more information on the 2005 EPA methodology, please visit: http://www.ine.es.
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Table 4 also shows the characteristics of immigrants by region of origin. As
reflected by the figures, there are notable differences across the three major migrant
groups in our sample: Africans, Non-15 Europeans, and Latinos. For instance, only
38.3% of Africans are female relative to 57.7% of Latinos. Additionally, 24.2% of
African migrants are household heads, compared with 19% of Latinos. Education-
wise, we also find important divergences across immigrant groups depending on
their origin. Forty-five percent of African migrants have no more than a primary
education, whereas only 15 and 21% of Non-15 Europeans and Latinos fall within
that category. In contrast, only 18% of African immigrants have a university degree
compared to 22% of Spanish natives or 27% of Europeans. Lastly, African migrants
endure the highest unemployment rate (approximately 14%) of all immigrants and
natives.
6 Results
Before turning to the first question we want to address in this paper, i.e., whether
immigrants are more responsive, in terms of their geographic location, to
employment opportunities than natives, it is important to make a clarification
regarding our units of observation. As noted in the methodology, the use of age-
education cells implicitly assumes similar employment opportunities are within
the reach of immigrants and natives with similar skills as captured by age and
education. This is a restricting assumption. After all, immigrants may also take
jobs typically occupied by natives with lower educational attainment if available.
Therefore, we also carry the analysis using age as our skill measure. In this
manner, we allow for immigrants to respond to employment rates for groups with
other educational attainment.
Additionally, we allow immigrants and natives to respond not only to
employment opportunities for individuals within their cell, but also to employment
opportunities for workers in adjacent cells. Specifically, in addition to the lagged
employment rate for individuals in their particular skill group (as captured by age-
education), we also examine the responsiveness of immigrants to employment
opportunities (as captured by the employment rate) for individuals in skill groups
defined exclusively by age. Because these employment rate measures are highly
correlated (the correlation coefficient is above 0.75), we carry out separate
estimations for each set of employment rates.
6.1 Are immigrants more responsive than natives to employment opportunities?
Table 5 displays the results from estimating Eq. 3 for all immigrants and for
separate immigrant groups according to their region of origin, i.e. Africa, Non-
15EU, and Latin America. The figures in Panel A in Table 5 reveal that, when
skill is defined in terms of age–education categories, immigrants as a whole are
more responsive than similarly skilled natives to regional employment opportu-
nities, particularly, those employment opportunities available for their own skill
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group.8 By immigrant origin, Africans appear the most responsive to existing
employment opportunities for their skill level, followed by Latinos. However,
non-15 EU immigrants do not seem to respond any differently than natives to
existing employment opportunities. When we use a broader definition of skill in
Panel B, we continue to find that immigrants are more responsive than natives to
employment opportunities. Yet, by immigrant origin, only Latinos seem to be
significantly more responsive than natives to existing employment conditions.9
Why would immigrants be more responsive than natives to employment
conditions? Immigrants are, by definition, a mobile population. Once they have
made the investment of breaking family and friendship ties in their home countries
to migrate to another country and start anew, the difference in psychic and economic
costs associated with residing in one region versus another in the host country
should be significantly smaller than for natives. After all, relative to immigrants,
natives still have to break the family and friendship ties and, thus incur, the psychic
costs that immigrants have already faced when deciding to come to Spain.
And, why would Africans and Latinos be more responsive than natives to
employment opportunities? African and Latino immigrants, perhaps as a result of
Table 5 Immigrant versus native responsiveness to employment opportunities
Immigrant groups All immigrants Africans Non-EU15
European
Latinos
Independent variables Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2
Panel A: dependent variable: Krs1 ðtÞ; (s1 = age-education) (Observations = 1,224)
Lagged employment rate





















Panel B: dependent variable: Krs2 ðtÞ; (s2 = age) (Observations = 408)
Lagged employment rate










The unit of observation is the region-skill-year cell. In Panel A, skill is defined in terms of age and
education (3 age groups and three education groups). The coefficients and R-squared shown in the table
are the results of different regressions, each of them including as an independent variable the lagged
employment rate defined at different levels of aggregation, i.e. skill 1 (defined by age and education) and
skill 2 (defined by age). In Panel B, skill is defined in terms of age. All estimations are weighted by cell
size. There are region, skill and year fixed-effect dummies. All regressions also include the skill, region,
and year fixed-effects fully interacted. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heterogeneity. **
Signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level or better and * at the 10% level or better
8 When the employment rate for their age-region-year category is used as the independent variable, the
sign is also positive. However, the coefficient is never statistically different from zero due to the higher
standard errors.
9 At this juncture, it is worth noting that, although the number of cells without immigrants is negligible
when examining all immigrants, the number of cells lacking immigrants when we distinguish immigrants
according to their origin is non-negligible. This is particularly the case when skill is defined in terms of
age and education. Consequently, we have also carried out the analysis excluding any immigrant-empty
cells. The results, which are available from the authors upon request, prove robust to the alternative
specification.
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the lesser degree of their skill transferability as compared to other migrants from
Europe where educational systems may be more alike owing to geopolitical aspects,
may have lower reservation wages than natives. Consequently, both immigrant
groups may be more responsive to employment opportunities that alike natives
would not even consider.
6.2 Does immigration help reduce regional employment disparities?
To further assess whether immigration helps reduce regional employment dispar-
ities, we estimate the panel VAR described in Sect. 4.2. Regional employment rate
convergence might occur if there is sufficient interregional native mobility.
However, native interregional mobility in Spain is very low. A recent report from
the Spanish Employment Institute (i.e. ‘‘INEM Employment Observatory’’ 2006)
shows that, as of 2006, 78% of Spanish citizens live in the same province in which
they were born. Since the province is a narrower geopolitical category than the
autonomous community used in this paper, we can exclude native mobility across
autonomous communities (so-called regions in this paper) as a potential factor
affecting regional employment convergence. Alternatively, it is also possible to not
find any significant labor market impacts if changes in the industrial structure
accommodate the increase in labor supply (e.g. Lewis 2003; Gonza´lez and Ortega
2010).
To make inferences about the dynamic relationship between immigration inflows
and regional employment disparities, we rely on the information provided by the
VDCs and IRFs. We first start with the VDCs, which are displayed in Table 6. A
couple of things are worth noting. First, each series explains the preponderance of
its own past values. Second, and of greater interest to us, is the fact that the VDCs
provide information about the relative importance of an immigration shock in
affecting regional employment disparities. Specifically, a non-negligible 6.5% of
the forecast error variance of regional employment rate disparities by skill group is
explained by innovations to the immigration penetration index. In contrast, regional
employment rate disparities explain only 0.3% of the forecast error variance of the
immigration penetration index for Spain. Therefore, the VDCs suggest that an
immigration shock can significantly impact regional employment disparities.
However, does it have a long-lived impact?
To answer these questions, we turn to the IRFs displayed in Fig. 2. The IRFs
trace the effect of a one-time shock to the immigration penetration index on current
and future values of the regional employment disparities. As can be seen from the
Table 6 Variance decompositions after ten periods
Variables Percentage of the variance explained by
Immigration penetration Regional employment rate disparities
Immigration penetration 0.997 0.003
Regional employment rate disparities 0.065 0.935
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IRF in the bottom left of Fig. 2, a one standard deviation shock to the immigration
penetration index results in an immediate statistically significant drop in the
regional employment disparities series. This result appears to be driven by the
impact that an increase in immigration inflows has in the regions receiving most
immigrants,10 where the regional employment disparities series takes on negative
values following a shock to the immigration penetration index. Consequently, an
immigration shock does seem to have a significantly different from zero impact on
regional employment rate disparities as defined in this paper. Yet, is this impact
short or long-lived? According to the IRF in the bottom left of Fig. 2, the impact
appears to be relatively short-lived, lasting a little bit more than 1 year. Why may
this be the case? This question is definitely worth exploring in future research. Since
the analysis herein does not allow us to address this question, we can only
hypothesize as for why and offer some plausible explanations. In particular, as noted
earlier, there may not be sufficient interregional native mobility to sustain regional
employment convergence or a longer-lived reduction in regional employment rate
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Fig. 2 Impulse response functions. RED stands for ‘‘regional employment disparities’’ as measured by
Eq. 4, whereas IP stands for the immigration penetration index described by Eq. 5
10 These results are shown in the Appendix. We also carried the analysis distinguishing between regions
with above and below the national average GDP per capita growth rate, as well as between regions with
above and below the national average unemployment rate. Results remained robust to these alternative
groupings and are available from the authors upon request.
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disparities. Alternatively, as found by Lewis (2003) for the US, industries in high
immigration regions may have absorbed immigration by adapting their factor
intensities to the change in skill distribution leaving employment rates essentially
unaffected (see Gonza´lez and Ortega (2010) for evidence of this being the case in
Spain).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we use data from the Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta de
Poblacio´n Activa) for the years 1999 through 2006 to assess the role of regional
labor market opportunities in explaining the continuous growth in immigrant flows
relative to internal migration on the part of natives during the 1990s. Specifically,
we ask ourselves whether immigrants are more responsive than their native
counterparts to regional labor market opportunities. Additionally, we explore
whether the growing stock of immigrants has helped grease the wheels of the
Spanish labor market and contributed to reducing labor market disparities across
regions by accelerating regional employment convergence.
Following Borjas (2001, 2003) and Card (2001), we estimate the impact of
employment opportunities on the relative supply of immigrants as compared to
natives using skill cells as units of observations. Subsequently, we analyze whether
the growing immigrant stock has helped reduce regional labor market disparities by
facilitating regional employment convergence for each skill group.
Our findings indicate that, overall, immigrants choose to reside in regions with
higher employment rates and where they also enjoy greater employment opportu-
nities given their skills. When distinguishing according to immigrant origin, we
further find that African and Latino immigrants appear more responsive than their
native counterparts to higher employment rates as well as to a higher likelihood of
employment. Yet, Non-15 Europeans do not seem to respond any different from
their native counterparts to existing employment opportunities. As we note in the
paper, our findings could be due to a variety of factors. African and Latino
immigrants, perhaps as a result of their limited skill transferability relative to
immigrants originating from European countries with similar educational systems,
in part owing to geopolitical aspects, may have lower reservation wages than
natives.
Additionally, the increased immigrant penetration may have accelerated regional
employment convergence by reducing regional employment disparities by skill
group. In particular, we find that innovations to the immigration penetration index
help explain up to 6.5% of the forecast error variance of regional employment rate
disparities by skill group. As such, the IRFs show that the immigration shock
significantly lowers regional employment rate disparities. However, this effect is
short-lived, disappearing after a one year period. We can only hypothesize as for
why. Perhaps, limited interregional native mobility is unable to sustain a long-lived
impact of the immigration shock on the regional employment rate disparities series
we define. Alternatively, industries in high immigration regions may have absorbed
immigration by adapting their factor intensities to the change in skill distribution
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leaving employment rates essentially unaffected. Finally, the lack of a significant
impact could also be partially due to the recent nature of immigration in Spain. Over
time, as the immigrant stock increases, it may impact regional employment rates
and, in turn, regional employment rate disparities in a more permanent manner. In
that case, it would be of interest to monitor this effect as immigration continues to
grow.
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Appendix
See Figs. 3, 4.
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Fig. 3 Impulse response functions using high immigration regions. RED stands for ‘‘regional
employment disparities’’ as measured by Eq. 4, whereas IP stands for the immigration penetration index
described by Eq. 5
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